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When Attackers Meet AI: Learning-empowered
Attacks in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
Zhengping Luo, Shangqing Zhao, Zhuo Lu, Jie Xu, and Yalin E. Sagduyu
Abstract—Defense strategies have been well studied to combat Byzantine attacks that aim to disrupt cooperative spectrum sensing by
sending falsified sensing data. However, existing studies usually make network or attack assumptions biased towards the defense
(e.g., assuming the prior knowledge of attacks is known). In practice, attackers can adopt any arbitrary behavior and avoid any
pre-assumed pattern or assumption used by defense strategies. In this paper, we revisit this traditional security problem and propose a
novel learning-empowered framework named Learn-Evaluate-Beat (LEB) to mislead the fusion center. Based on the black-box nature
of the fusion center in cooperative spectrum sensing process, our new perspective is to make the adversarial use of machine learning
to construct a surrogate model of the fusion center’s decision model. Then, we propose a generic algorithm to create malicious sensing
data. Our real-world experiments show that the LEB attack is very effective to beat a wide range of existing defense strategies with an
up to 82% of success ratio. Given the gap between the new LEB attack and existing defenses, we introduce a non-invasive and parallel
method named as influence-limiting policy sided with existing defenses to defend against the LEB-based or other similar attacks, which
demonstrates a strong performance in terms of overall disruption ratio reduction by up to 80% of the LEB attacks.
Index Terms—Cooperative spectrum sensing, system security, defenses and attacks, adversarial machine learning.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
COOPERATIVE spectrum sensing has been proposed asan effective mechanism to enhance the spectrum sens-
ing performance using cognitive radio devices (e.g., TV-
band devices coded in IEEE 802.22). It enables a data
fusion-based decision framework, in which multiple nodes
report their sensing results to a fusion center that makes a
centralized decision to enhance the spectrum sensing accu-
racy. This, however, opens up opportunities for Byzantine
attacks (also widely referred to as spectrum sensing data
falsification attacks) [1]–[8], in which attackers aim to send
malicious sensing results to mislead the fusion center to
make wrong decisions.
Defense mechanisms to combat Byzantine attacks have
been widely studied and include: (i) statistics-based mech-
anisms, i.e., building statistical models to detect or elimi-
nate attacks [4], [9]–[11]; (ii) machine learning-based mech-
anisms, i.e., using machine learning methods as counter-
measures [2], [6], [12]–[14]; (iii) trust (or reputation)-based
mechanisms, i.e., building trust metrics for nodes to be
weighted in the decision process to identify or mitigate
attacks [3], [5].
Nevertheless, existing studies mainly make network or
attack assumptions that often biased towards defenses. For
example, methods used in [4], [9], [11] assume that attacks
behave in a particular way or prior information of attack
statistics is known such that a statistical model of an attack
can be built; and machine learning based methods [2], [6],
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[13], [14] assume that malicious data pattern deviates from
normal data pattern under a given classification rule. These
assumptions give an advantage to the defenses over the
attacks. However, in practice, attackers can try to actively
avoid pre-assumed behaviors or break assumptions used in
the defense. Moreover, the time-varying nature of wireless
channels and signals can deviate the data properties of the
legitimate sensing results from time to time. In this regard,
training and prior statistical models used by the defenses
face a model mismatch phenomenon over time, which can
also be exploited by attackers. All these motivate us to
rethink Byzantine attacks from a new perspective: is there
a stronger attack model?
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Fig. 1: Abstract model of data processing in cooperative
spectrum sensing.
Our new observations on cooperative spectrum sensing
are twofold: (i) Sensing nodes always report their sensing
data as the input to the fusion center; and (ii) regardless
of what kinds of defense mechanisms it adopts, the fusion
center always announces the final decision, which is the
output from the fusion center. If we treat the fusion center
as a black box, the defense and decision rules together in the
fusion center can be considered as a black-box function with
known inputs and outputs, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Inspired
by the no free lunch theorem [15] and the transferability [16]
property in machine learning, attackers can, in fact, use the
inputs and outputs shown in Fig. 1 to build a surrogate
model of the targeted fusion center, and then launch effec-
tive attacks with minimum data manipulation to mislead
2the fusion center. However, the model is essentially a partial
model of the fusion center.
To make the partial model to attack cooperative spec-
trum sensing process, we propose a Learn-Evaluate-Beat
(LEB) framework in this paper. As its name indicates, LEB
consists of three steps: (i) the initial learning step, in which
the attacker uses incremental learning models to build its
own surrogate model to approximate the fusion center’s
decision model; (ii) the evaluation step, in which the at-
tacker evaluates whether its own model is accurate enough
or not to launch attacks; and (iii) the final beating step,
in which the attacker falsifies the sensing data with the
minimum cost to change the fusion center’s decision if
they pass the evaluation step. To design LEB attacks to be
effective, we also propose a learning algorithm based on a
set of sub-models and a generic data generation algorithm
to generate adversarial examples (i.e., falsified data with
the minimum data manipulation to flip the fusion center’s
decision) in sub-models. We conduct comprehensive real-
world experiments to measure the performance of spectrum
sensing under LEB attacks and their impacts against a wide
range of existing defense methods.
Towards the defense perspective, an effective defense
mechanism to distinguish LEB-based or similar malicious
nodes out from normal nodes is quite challenging. The
principal reason that LEB attackers can succeed contributes
to that the malicious nodes can build up their influence
or impact on the fusion center through taking advantage
of the model mismatch phenomenon. We introduce a new
metric named as decision flipping influence to measure
the influence of a given subset of sensing nodes. Based
on the decision flipping influence, we further propose an
influence-limiting policy to evaluate and limit the influence
any subset of nodes can have on the fusion center, thus
decreasing or eliminating the attack capability of the mali-
cious nodes. The influence-limiting policy is a non-invasive,
parallel method sided with traditional/existing defenses.
Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
defense can effectively bridge the gap between traditional
defenses in cooperative spectrum sensing and the new LEB-
based attacks.
Our contributions are listed as follows.
• We rethink the traditional security of cooperative spec-
trum sensing and present a new perspective to create
a stronger attack model named as LEB attack. Our
work has shown that the traditional duel of attacks
and defenses in cooperative spectrum sensing has to be
re-visited in the presence of new learning-based attack
models.
• For the LEB framework to be effective and practical,
the framework is designed in a flexible way to adopt a
wide range of sub-models to build the surrogate model
of the fusion center. A generic generation algorithm is
proposed to create adversarial examples against coop-
erative spectrum sensing.
• Our experiments show that the LEB attack can achieve
an up to 82% attack success ratio while only manipulat-
ing a small number of malicious nodes. The proposed
adversarial data generation algorithm achieves similar
performances as existing generation methods while re-
ducing by 65% of the computational cost on average.
Sensing reports
Decision output ĂĂ
Fusion 
Center
Innocous nodes Malicious nodes
Fig. 2: System model.
• We introduce a generic non-invasive method, the
influence-limiting policy, sided with traditional/exist-
ing defenses to counter LEB attacks or other sim-
ilar learning-based attacks. Experimental results of
influence-limiting policy-based defense demonstrate an
average overall disruption ratio reduction by 78% un-
der LEB attacks compared with traditional defenses
while without the influence-limiting policy.
• The LEB attack and Influence-limiting policy proposed
in this paper can be extended to a more generic partial
model problem in machine learning, in which a mali-
cious attacker controls part of the input dimensions to
compromise the machine learning model. This paper
is a pioneering exploration of the topic in machine
learning.
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the system model, overview
existing studies, and identify issues.
2.1 System Model
We consider a cooperative spectrum sensing network sce-
nario with n sensing nodes and one fusion center, as shown
in Fig. 2. In each timeslot (i.e., each round of sensing), all
nodes perform spectrum sensing on a TV spectrum channel,
then report their results to the data fusion center that makes
the global channel usability decision based on all inputs. We
assume that energy detection [4], [9] is employed at each
node, and a sensing report contains the value of the energy
level sensed by a node.
The value of the sensed energy level vector at the
ith timeslot from n sensing nodes is denoted by xi =
[xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,n]
⊤, xi ∈ X ⊂ R
n×1, where ·⊤ is the
matrix transpose operator. X ⊂ Rn×1 is the value
space for the sensed energy level, and Rn×1 is an n-
dimensional Euclidean space. The historical sensing re-
sults of the sensing nodes are denoted as {hk}k∈[1,n] =
[x1,k, x2,k, x3,k, ..., xi,k]
⊤.
Fusion center makes the final channel status decision
yi ∈ Y based on the sensed results xi ∈ X ⊂ R
n×1.
We denote the decision mapping function (implemented
by the data fusion rule and the potential defenses) used
in fusion center as O : X → Y , where Y = {−1, 1} is
the decision output space of the fusion center with −1/1
denoting the channel available/unavailable. We assume the
attacker has no information about the decision mapping
function adopted in the fusion center while knows only the
final decision {yi} of the fusion center at each timeslot i.
Cooperative spectrum sensing enables multiple nodes to
report their sensing results to a fusion center to enhance the
3spectrum sensing accuracy, in which Byzantine attackers can
send malicious sensing results to the fusion center, mislead-
ing the fusion center to make wrong decisions about the
channel status and further cause collisions between primary
users of the spectrum with the secondary users.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the first m
nodes in all n nodes are malicious nodes fully controlled by
the attacker. The attacker can make the malicious nodes to
report whatever sensing results the attacker wants but has
no information about the remaining n−m innocuous nodes.
We denote the sensing data vector by malicious nodes
at timeslot i as ai = [xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,m]
⊤, ai ∈ A ⊂ R
m×1,
where A is the report space of malicious nodes. Obviously,
ai is the first part of xi that
xi = [xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai
, xi,m+1, ..., xi,n]
⊤, xi ∈ X . (1)
The objective of the attacker is to manipulate sensing
data vector ai to mislead the fusion center to yield a wrong
sensing decision yi for as many timeslot i as possible.
2.2 Defending against Byzantine Attacks
The defenses against Byzantine attacks in cooperative spec-
trum sensing can be essentially viewed as an anomaly
detection problem, in which abnormal nodes need to be
distinguished out from innocuous nodes. Most of the de-
fenses proposed in previous works are a combination of two
or multiple aspects of node characteristics, such as pattern,
statistical consistency or whatever. Here we classify them
into three categories by the main node characteristic those
defenses used:
• Statistics-based. It usually assumes that attackers behave in
a particular way or prior information of network or attack
statistics are known [4], [9], [11]. As the most widely used
approaches to detect malicious nodes, statistics related
schemes defend fusion center against attackers based on
the statistical measures derived from the sensing report
history {hk}k∈[1,n], such as covariance, deviation and so
on [4], [9], [10].
• Machine learning-based. It assumes malicious and innocu-
ous nodes have different underlying data patterns, i.e.,
{hk}k∈[1,m] of malicious nodes and {hk}k∈[m+1,n] of in-
nocuous nodes can be classified by machine learning tech-
niques. Both supervised [6] and unsupervised [2], [13],
[14] methods have been proposed to identify or eliminate
malicious nodes.
• Trust (or reputation)-based. The essence of trust based de-
fense is to compute a trust metric based on {hk}k∈[1,n].
Those nodes with low trust metrics are detected as mali-
cious nodes and get eliminated or less weighted from the
decision process. It’s worth noting that trust based meth-
ods usually compute trust metrics based on mathematical
deviations obtained in statistics basedmechanisms [3], [5].
As aforementioned, we find that most of the defenses
make various assumptions that are in fact often biased to-
ward the defenses. For example, many of the statistics-based
defenses [4], [9] assume that there exist specific statistical
models for malicious nodes different from innocuous nodes
(e.g., similar distribution among innocuous nodes while
different from those malicious nodes); and that different pat-
terns for {hk}k∈[1,m] of malicious nodes and {hk}k∈[m+1,n]
of innocuous nodes can be classified and sorted out.
2.3 Model Mismatch in Realistic Network Scenarios
Given the aforementioned assumptions made by the de-
fenses, is there any model mismatch phenomenon between
the assumed and realistic scenarios? I.e., is the statistical
or other characteristics for each node at different timeslots
maintained unchanged? We explore the model mismatch
phenomenon both in spatial and temporal dimensions. Two
datasets are used in our exploration. One is collected over
13 TV white space channels at 5282 locations in Atlanta
metropolitan area [17]. The other one is collected by us using
5 USRP N210s [18] to collect signal strengths at 5 different
locations on 22 channels over a 20 × 20 km2 urban region
for a 100-hour period.
The signal strengths for one TV channel at different loca-
tions from the dataset of [17] in Fig. 3(a) illustrates that the
sensed signal strengths can be highly related to the location
of sensing. Further, we use our dataset to show probability
distributions of the TV white space signal strengths at 5
locations in Fig. 3(b). It is easy to observe in Fig. 3(b) that
locations C and E have the lowest signal strength while
location B has the highest signal strength of one TV channel.
We then measure how the signal strength varies over
time. The 100-hour dataset is divided into 5 continuous 20-
hour sub-datasets. The probability distributions of the signal
strengths for each sub-dataset are plotted in Fig. 3(c), we can
see that as time goes by, the probability distribution changes
over different sub-datasets. This indicates that a statistical or
data model built for one time period will indeed change for
another time period.
Our data analysis on existing dataset and collected
dataset demonstrate that the statistical/data model mis-
match phenomenon over space and time is quite common
in practice. In another words, the signal strengths of both
malicious and innocuous nodes can hardly follow the ex-
act models/behaviors assumed in a defense strategy. The
existence of such phenomenon is also reasonable because
of (i) environmental factors, such as weather and buildings,
and (ii) network factors, such as co-channel interference and
adjacent-channel leakages from other broadcasting activi-
ties.
The model mismatch phenomenon will further lead to
two consequences: (i) uncertainty of sensing results will
occur amongmultiple nodes (even among innocuous nodes)
simultaneously, and (ii) the parameters for the optimal
decision to decide the channel status are very hard to find
over time. Thus, an intelligent attacker can try to learn what
decision models the fusion center uses, then take advantage
of the learned model and generate malicious sensing data
specifically targeting the decision model.
3 LEB FRAMEWORK: MOTIVATION AND DESIGN
In this section, we first present the motivation behind the
adversarial learning-based attack design, and then propose
the LEB framework against cooperative spectrum sensing.
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Fig. 3: (a) Signal strengths for one channel over 5282 different locations in Atlanta metropolitan area [17]; (b) Signal strengths
distribution over different locations in our dataset; (c) Signal strengths distribution over different time periods (0-20, 21-40,
41-60,61-80,81-100) in our dataset.
3.1 Attack Motivation
As we can see, the fusion center can be hard to have perfect
models about practical signal data statistics or patterns due
to the spatially and temporally varying nature of the wire-
less environment. Moreover, if we turn the table around and
think from an intelligent attacker’s perspective, the attacker
should never behave as assumed in any defense.
Our key observations for designing a new attack model
are twofold: (i) network nodes always report their sens-
ing data to the fusion center; and (ii) regardless of what
kind of defense mechanism it adopts, the center always
announces the final decision, which exposes valuable in-
formation about the decision model given the input sensing
data. If we treat the fusion center as a black box, the decision
model (i.e. the defense and the fusion rule) in the center can
be considered as a black-box function with known inputs
and outputs. As a result, attackers can in fact use the inputs
and outputs shown in Fig. 2 to build a surrogate model
of the decision model used in the targeted fusion center.
After stealing the decision model, the attacker can launch
attacks with minimum data manipulation to mislead the
fusion center.
Such a learning-based attack model can gradually learn
the decision model adopted in the fusion center and is
also practically feasible as it does not require the prior
knowledge of the decision model or its training data.
3.2 LEB Architecture
Leveraging the new observations, we propose a Learn-
Evaluate-Beat (LEB) framework for attacks against cooper-
ative spectrum sensing in this paper. As its name indicates,
LEB consists of three steps: (i) the initial learning step,
in which the attacker uses incremental learning models to
build its own surrogate model to approximate the fusion
center’s decision model;(ii) the evaluation setup, in which
the attacker evaluates whether its own model is accurate
enough to launch attacks, and (iii) the final beating step,
in which adversarial sensing results are generated to beat
the decision model. The flow chart of the LEB framework is
shown in Fig. 4.
3.2.1 Learn
The learning step aims to build the surrogate model Si
at timeslot i to approximate the decision model O in the
Evaluation
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center
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Decision output 
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Fig. 4: The LEB framework.
fusion center given the malicious nodes’ reporting vector
{aj}j∈[0,i] and the fusion center’s decision {yj}j∈[0,i]. As
the LEB attacker has no initial knowledge of the decision
model O, the learning step in LEB should be generic and
flexible.
Our learning idea is inspired by (i) the no free lunch
theorem [15], which states that any two machine learning
algorithms are equivalent when their performances are av-
eraged across all possible problems, and (ii) transferability
[16] in machine learning, which means that as long as
models are trained to perform the same task, the influence
of adversarial inputs for one model can often be transferred
to other models, even if they have different architectures or
are trained on different training parameters or datasets.
As a result, we are motivated to use a set of different ma-
chine learning models together to approximate the decision
model O as the decision model is unknown. Specifically, the
surrogate model Si consists of L machine learning models,
called sub-models. Each sub-model is denoted as
Sl,i : A → Y,A ⊂ R
m×1,Y = {−1, 1}, l = 1, 2, · · · , L, (2)
where m is the number of malicious nodes controlled by
the attacker. Each sub-model is a particular representative
machine learning model and is trained on the same sets
{aj}j∈[0,i] and {yj}j∈[0,i].
3.2.2 Evaluate
As Fig. 4 shows, even we use all of the malicious nodes
together to build the surrogate model, the model is only
a partial one because the fusion center will also use the
sensing data from other innocuous nodes. Thus, the goal
of the evaluation procedure is to (i) evaluate whether the
5partial model is accurate enough and (ii) use model selection
to select the best sub-model to launch the attack.
At timeslot i, the attacker uses each of its sub-models Sl,i
to classify the current data vector ai and obtains its local
decision zi = Sl,i(ai). Then, the attacker compares zi with
the fusion center’s decision yi, and maintains a metric called
internal accuracy for each sub-model Sl,i, which is defined
as Al,i =
1
i
∑i
j=0 1{zi=yi} ∈ [0, 1], where 1{zi=yi} denotes
the indicator function that has value of 1 if zi = yi and value
of 0 otherwise. The internal accuracy means how accurate a
sub-model can track the fusion center’s decision model.
In the evaluation step, if the highest internal accuracy
in all sub-models is greater than a given threshold α, the
attacker will select the sub-model as its final surrogate
model for timeslot i and enters the beating procedure for
the i-th timeslot. Otherwise, the attacker will not attack,
but simply send the real sensing data to the fusion center.
This evaluation procedure ensures that the attacker will
not attack with low confidence, which is also designed to
improve the attack success probability under trust-based
defenses.
We denote by Sl∗,i the best sub-model with the high-
est internal accuracy selected at timeslot i, where l∗ =
argmaxl∈[1,L] Al,i if Sl∗,i > α. Then, we can write the
surrogate model as
Si = Sl∗,i = Sargmaxl∈[1,L] Al,i,i. (3)
3.2.3 Beat
The goal of the beating step is to craft adversarial sensing
results based on the selected sub-model to beat the decision
model in the fusion center and get a desired output. De-
noting by a∗i the attacker’s adversarial sensing results, we
write a∗i = ai + δi, where ai is the real sensing data and δi
is called the adversarial perturbation. The beating step finds
the best δi with the minimum data manipulation satisfying
Objective: argmin
δi∈D
‖δi‖2,
Subject to: Sl∗,i(a
∗
i ) = Sl∗,i(ai + δi) 6= Sl∗,i(ai),
(4)
where ‖ · ‖2 is the L2-norm and D is the feasible solution
space of δi, which is a constraint put onto a
∗ to limit the
maximum report result amax and minimum report result
amin, which ensures that it can avoid being detected under
defenses like outlier-based malicious nodes detection [4].
3.2.4 Update
All sub-models in the LEB framework need to be updated
continuously over time and will be re-trained through
adding new input and output data in each round of spec-
trum sensing. The nature of such re-training is to incremen-
tally add training data to its already trained model, such
that a more accurate model can be found as timeslot goes on.
Therefore, LEB can adopt online/incremental sub-models to
efficiently update its training. In this way, LEB can not only
be updated with new sensing data in a dynamic network
environment, but also be trained to adopt more information
about the fusion center’s decision model.
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Fig. 5: Pilot model-based adversarial sensing result genera-
tion.
3.3 Generic Adversarial Sensing Data Generation
As articulated in the beating step, we must find the best
δi with the minimum data manipulation to satisfy Eq. (4).
When the best sub-model is chosen as the surrogate model
Si = Sl∗,i, δi can be found via solving a method-specific
optimization problem. For example, we can use the fast
gradient sign methods (FGSM) [19] or the Jacobian-based
saliency map approach (JBSM) [20] to find the best δi if
the selected sub-model is DNN. However, this complicates
the solution to Eq. (4) in the beating step, makes it depend
on a specific type of sub-models and also makes it less
flexible and less generic as the surrogate model contains
L sub-models, which is extendable by design in the LEB
framework.
We aim to provide a generic adversarial sensing data
generation algorithm to solve Eq. (4). Our design intuition
is as follows: (i) Unlike complicated data representation
(e.g., image and voice data), signal strength data provides
straightforward information: a larger value more likely indi-
cates the fact that a channel is occupied and a less value indi-
cates otherwise. Therefore, search is more likely toward one
direction in Eq. (4). (ii) Transferability in machine learning
indicates that if we can easily find the adversarial example
(i.e., the manipulated input data with the minimum change
to make a classifier change its classification output) of one
sub-model, we can transfer it to other sub-models. However,
in LEB framework, different final surrogate models will be
selected as timeslot goes on. Inspired from that, we propose
a pilot model-based adversarial sensing result generation
method.
The proposed pilot model-based method is specifically
designed for the cooperative spectrum sensing scenario,
which consists of two steps: Step 1, estimating the decision
hyperplane of the training sensing results {ai}i∈[0,i] from
malicious nodes, which is determined by w · a+ b = 0 for a
small set of sensing results (a from {ai}i∈[0,i] a.k.a. support
vectors in SVM [21]) from the training data of the surrogate
model. w is the trained weight vector and b denotes the bias
(or intercept) (as shown in Fig. 5, in which we consider a two
dimension situation, denoted as x1 and x2); Step 2, based
on w and uses binary search structure along the direction
defined by w to find the final δi to form the adversarial
report a∗ of the selected sub-model.
The procedure of the proposed method is shown in
Algorithm 1. We can use SVM as the pilot model due to
its outstanding transferability performances [16] in practise.
However, it is not necessary to train an extra pilot model,
instead, we can choose the sub-model that has the best
internal accuracy with the fusion center as the pilot model
6Algorithm 1: Adversarial Sensing Result Generation
Input : Sensing result ai, feasible solution space D,
selected sub-model Si, algorithm termination
threshold ǫ, trained pilot model
parameters:w, b;
Output: Adversarial perturbation δi;
1 Set two boundary vectors amin and amax according to
D;
2 Set sgn = −sign(w · ai + b);
3 Set initial value: δi ← sgn× dmarginw;
4 if Si(ai + δi) 6= Si(ai), then
5 l← 0; r← dmargin;
6 repeat
7 if Si(ai + (sgn(l + r)/2)w) 6= Si(ai), then
8 r ← l + (r − l)/2;
9 else
10 l ← l + (r − l)/2;
11 end if
12 until ‖r − l‖ ≤ ǫ;
13 if Si(ai + sgn× rw) 6= Si(ai), then
14 Return the adversarial perturbation:
15 δi ← sgn× rw.
16 else
17 terminate without any feasible solution.
18 end if
19 else
20 terminate without any feasible solution.
21 end if
among models that involving learning a hyperplane (such
as Passive Aggressive algorithm [22] and other classifiers).
Because of the worst-case logarithmic complexity of the
binary search structure, the proposed algorithm is expected
to yield a fast and efficient solution to Eq. (4) for cooperative
spectrum sensing scenarios.
4 EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
In this section, we collect real-world TV white space signal
strengths, based on which we conduct the experiments to
measure the impacts of LEB attacks under various condi-
tions.
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Measurement Configurations
We collect the realistic TV white space signal strengths
based on the RTL-SDR TV dongles, which have been val-
idated to have adequate signal detection capabilities [17].
We deployed 20 RTL-SDR TV dongles as sensing nodes on
campus to collect signal strengths on TV channels based
on the configurations used in [17] simultaneously. We use
GNURadio v3.7.9 to implement the sensing process for each
dongle that uses the averaged signal power over a time
period of 30 seconds (required by Federal Communications
Commission [23]) as the sensing result for one timeslot.
To make the collected signal data comprehend the re-
alistic spectrum sensing scenarios as much as possible,
we deployed the sensing devices in various surrounding
: Node 1-6, 1
st
 floor, hall : Node 7-9, 2
th
 floor, office
: Node 10-12, 3
th
 floor, office : Node 13-20, rooftop, outdoor
Fig. 6: Deployment of 20 RTL-SDRs.
environments. Fig. 6 shows how 20 RTL-SDR TV dongles are
deployed throughout a 379× 232 ft2 building: 8 TV dongles
are placed outside of the building and 12 are distributed
within the building on different floors and indoor environ-
ments. We distribute TV dongles at these various places and
evironments to denote different spectrum sensing scenarios
in practice, in which the deployment way is similar with
the VT cognitive radio network testbed [24]. We collect the
TV white space channel signal strengths on 22 different
channels for 100 continuous hours on each sensing node,
such that the dynamic model mismatch phenomenon can
be sensed and recorded in the dataset.
4.1.2 Fusion Center Configurations
We implement 8 representative defenses in the fusion center.
Specifically, four statistics based defenses: Outlier factors
based defense (Outlier) [4], Local Outlier Factor based de-
fense (LOF) [25], Empirical Covariance based (EmpCov)
and Robust Covariance based (RobCov)) detections [26])
and three machine learning based defenses: fuzzy kNN
based defense (fzKNN) [13], Double-Sided Neighbor Dis-
tance based defense (DSND) [2] and One-class SVM based
detection (OCSVM) [14]. We also implement one trust-based
detection method (Trust) [3].
There are two steps for the fusion center to make a
decision. At step 1, the fusion center accepts sensing results
from all nodes, based on which it runs the deployed defense
strategy to assess the suspicious level of each node. Given
the suspicious level, data from each node is re-calibrated
such that potential malicious nodes have less impacts on
the fusion process. Step 2 is the data fusion process of the re-
calibrated nodes. There are various data fusion rules such as
SVM, Logistic Regression (LR), AND, OR and Majority rule.
Our experimental results show the LEB attack is effective
against different types of data fusion rules. Due to the page
limit, we use the SVM-based fusion rule [6], [27] to show
the experimental results of the LEB attacker in this section
of the experiments.
7There is no attack in the training process in our experi-
ments. Among all 22 channels collected, we select the chan-
nel that has the largest deviations of the signal strengths
to evaluate the LEB framework. We use sensed data of the
first 5 hours collected from 20 nodes and the corresponding
ground truths of the TV channel status in our local area
to build statistical models and serve as training data for
the implemented defense methods in the fusion center,the
remaining 80 hours of the data is used as validation and test
data.
4.1.3 LEB Framework Configurations
We implement the LEB framework based on malicious
nodes. The surrogate model consists of 6 incremental learn-
ing based sub-models: Naive Bayes classifier for multi-
nomial models (MulNB), Perceptron classifier (Per), Lin-
ear SVM classifier with stochastic gradient descent train-
ing (SGD), Passive Aggressive-I classifier (PA-I), Passive
Aggressive-II classifier (AP-II) and Multi-layer Perceptron
classifier (MLP).
Without loss of generality, we let the duel of cooperative
spectrum sensing and the LEB attacker that controls the
malicious nodes starts at timeslot 0 (started from the 6th
hour) and the defense has already been trained using the
first 5 hours of the collected data. At each timeslot (30
seconds for one timeslot), the LEB attacker will learn and
evaluate the surrogate model and possible channel status
to launch potential attacks. The fusion center will make
a binary decision based on the defense and data fusion
method.
In the evaluation step, the internal accuracy threshold
α is chosen to be 0.85 unless otherwise specified. In the
beating step, the LEB attacker generates adversarial sensing
data based on the generic generation algorithm proposed in
Section 3.3.
4.1.4 Performance Metrics
We evaluate the LEB attacker through two metrics: attack
success ratio and overall disruption ratio. The attack success
ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of attacks that
successfully mislead the fusion center to make the wrong
decision to the number of attack attempts. We define the
overall disruption ratio as the ratio of the number of suc-
cessful attacks to the number of elapsed timeslots. A higher
attack success ratio does not necessarily mean a higher over-
all disruption ratio. This is because when the LEB attacker
does not pass the evaluation step (e.g., it can have a large
threshold α to make an attack attempt succeed with high
probability), it will not launch the attack and thus will cause
no disruption to the network.
In comparison, the attack success ratio measures the
learning and evaluation quality of the LEB framework,
and the overall disruption ratio quantifies the performance
impact the LEB attacker brings to the entire cooperative
sensing network.
4.2 Results and Analysis
4.2.1 Attack Impacts on Defense Strategies
We first measure impacts of the LEB attacker on each of the
8 defense strategies used by the fusion center. We randomly
select 8 nodes as malicious nodes to be controlled by the
LEB attacker from the collected dataset. The LEB attacker
updates its internal accuracy for each sub-model to evaluate
and beat the fusion center. Fig. 7 shows the attacker’s in-
ternal accuracy of sub-models over timeslot against defense
strategy (a) Outlier, (b) LOF, (c) EmpCov, (d) RobCov, (e)
fzKNN, (f) DSDN, (g) OCSVM and (h) Trust. We can observe
from Fig. 7 that when the attacker initially starts to learn, the
internal accuracy of each sub-model changes drastically; but
as the timeslot goes on, the internal accuracy becomes more
and more stable. For example, in Fig. 7 (c), the accuracy start
to remain stable at around 0.85 after 500 timeslots.
Fig. 8 illustrates the attack success ratio and overall
disruption ratio of the LEB attacker against each defense
method. It is noted from Fig. 8 that the LEB attacker achieves
71%–90% attack success ratios against different methods,
which means that the learning and evaluation design in
the LEB framework is effective for the attacker to assess
its potential capability to launch successful attacks. We can
also observe from Fig. 8 that the attacker causes overall
disruption ratios by 45%–80%, which indicates that the LEB
attacker is able to successfully mislead the fusion center to
make wrong decisions for 45%–80% of the time, thereby
resulting in severe disruptions.
4.2.2 Impacts of Threshold α
A key factor in LEB framework is the internal accuracy
threshold α. The attacker can only launch attacks if the in-
ternal accuracy of a sub-model exceeds α. A larger α should
lead to a higher attack success ratio but not necessarily a
higher overall disruption ratio.
Fig. 9 depicts (a) the attack success ratio and (b) the over-
all disruption ratio under different values of α (other setups
are the same as those in Fig. 8 and results are averaged over
8 defense strategies). We can see from Fig. 9(a) that when
α is 0.7 or less, the attack success ratio is around 0.5. As
α increases, the attack success ratio also increases, which
is because an increased α requirement indicates a higher
confidence for the selected sub-model.
However, in terms of the overall disruption ratio, al-
though a smaller α will lead to more attack attempts, it
will be easier to activate the defense mechanisms in the
fusion center to compromise the malicious nodes, further
decrease the overall disruption ratio. The overall disruption
ratio increases first and then decreases as the threshold α
approaches to 1, as shown in Fig. 9(b). This is because as the
threshold α approaches to 1, the number of attack attempts
decreases dramatically. Thus although the attack success
ratio increases, the overall number of attacks plunged. We
observe from our experiments that the optimal threshold
can be achieved at around α = 0.85 to maximize the overall
disruption ratio.
4.2.3 Impacts of the Number of Malicious Nodes
The number of malicious nodes controlled by the LEB
attacker is a fundamental factor that affects the attack im-
pact. Table 1 shows the overall disruption ratios against
different defenses when the number of randomly selected
malicious nodes increases from 2 to 10 (i.e., 10% to 50% of all
nodes). We can see from Table 1 that as the malicious nodes
approaches 10, which is half of the total sensing nodes, the
8(a) Outlier (b) LOF (c)  EmpCov (d) RobCov
(e)  fzKNN (f) DSDN (g)  OCSVM (h) Trust
Fig. 7: Internal accuracy transitions of the LEB attacker under different defenses.
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Fig. 9: Relationship between α and the attack success ratio
of LEB attacker.
overall disruption ratio (averaged over all defenses) reaches
72%, which means that the spectrum sensing is disrupted by
the attacker 72% of the elapsed timeslots. The attack impact
can still be observed even when the number of malicious
nodes is small. For example, 3 malicious nodes (15% of all
nodes) can lead to a nearly 20% overall disruption ratio.
It can be concluded from Table 1 that the LEB framework
TABLE 1: Overall Disruption Ratio (%) vs Number of Mali-
cious Nodes
# Mal. Nodes: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Outlier: 8 20 23 24 34 38 65 68 72
LOF: 6 15 23 25 35 36 58 60 65
EmpCov: 9 22 27 35 37 39 52 59 66
RobCov: 7 15 22 30 39 41 53 56 64
fzKNN: 10 21 27 45 45 49 78 80 82
DSND: 11 23 31 44 46 47 80 85 86
OCSVM: 9 21 31 39 48 51 76 79 80
Trust: 6 16 21 29 34 38 45 56 60
Average 8 19 28 34 40 42 63 69 72
provides an effective attack strategy even when the number
of malicious nodes is small.
4.2.4 Impacts of Locations of Malicious Nodes
In previous experiments, we always randomly select nodes
as malicious ones. We are also interested in whether mali-
cious nodes can bring more impacts to the network if they
choose to be at “better” locations. We divide the dongles
into 4 groups with 5 in each group. The experiments are
conducted by using one group as malicious ones while the
others being innocuous.
The results are depicted in Fig. 10, from which we know
that when controlling nodes 16–20 (distributed in outside
environment) as malicious ones, the overall disruption ratio
can achieve 43% averaged over all 8 defenses. However,
if nodes 6–10 (distributed in indoor environment) are con-
trolled, the averaged overall disruption ratio is only 17%.
Hence, we can conclude that it is critical for the LEB attacker
to be at the “right” locations in order to launch more
effective attacks.
4.2.5 Efficiency of Adversarial Sensing Data Generation
We also compare the performance of the proposed adversar-
ial sensing result generation method with other adversar-
ial sample generation methods: Fast gradient sign method
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Fig. 10: Overall disruption ratios when manipulating differ-
ent nodes.
(FGSM) [19], Jacobian-based saliency map approach (JBSM)
[20], DeepFool method (DF) [28], Basic iterative method
(BaIter) [29], SPSA attack method (SPSA) [30] and Elastic-
Net method (EN) [31] in Deep Neural Network, imple-
mented based on CleverHans V2.1.0 [32].
In the experiments, 8 nodes are randomly selected as
malicious nodes and use different adversarial data genera-
tion methods in the LEB framework to generate malicious
data inputs to the fusion center. Fig. 11 shows (a) the attack
success ratios and overall disruption ratios under different
generation methods and (b) the normalized costs of the
generation methods in which we define the normalized cost
of a generation method as its computational time to generate
the adversarial data vector divided by the computational
time of our proposed method to generate the adversarial
data (thus our proposed method has a normalized cost of
1).
Fig. 11(a) shows that our proposed method has the
similar attack success ratios and overall disruption ratios to
other methods. Fig. 11(b) further shows that our method is
much more computationally efficient than the other meth-
ods. For example, SPSA has a normalized cost of around
4.5, and the overall average computation cost reduction
compared to other methods is around 65%.
5 DEFENSE AGAINST LEB ATTACK
The LEB attack poses a new security threat to security
spectrum sensing. In this section, we propose a mechanism
named as influence-limiting policy to combat the LEB or ma-
chine learning based attacks. We design influence-limiting
as a non-invasive method to the existing defenses. Thus,
it can bridge the gap between traditional defenses and the
new LEB attacks.
5.1 Motivation
In a scenario where the LEB attacker is present, most of the
traditional defenses, such as statistics-based defenses [4], [9],
[11], machine learning-based defenses [2], [6], [13], [14] and
trust value-based methods [3], [5] fall short of the capability
due to three main challenges in practice:
• The identified model mismatch phenomenon resulted
from spatial and temporal unevenness will lead to dy-
namic changes of the statistical property at each sensing
node.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 11: Comparison of the adversarial sensing result gener-
ation methods.
• When the attacker decides not to launch the attack,
manipulated nodes can intentionally behave “normal”
through correcting random mistakes by combining all
the sensing results of manipulated nodes to make the
channel status decision. It improves the statistical con-
sistency of those controlled nodes in no-attack timeslots
with the fusion center, such that they can maintain
competitive attack budget in attack timeslots to avoid
trust value-based defenses.
• When the manipulated nodes decide to launch the
attack, they can learn an efficient way through the
LEB framework. It minimizes the pattern deviations,
which makes the pattern-learning based defenses more
difficult to distinguish the pattern differences.
To our best knowlege, there are still lack of robust and
generic strategies to combat these challenges in cooperative
spectrum sensing. On the other hand, from the machine
learning perspective, although there are many strategies
to combat adversarial samples in machine learning [33]–
[35], most of the defense mechanisms for machine learning
systems fall into two aspects: gradient masking [35]–[37]
and adversarial sample detection [38].
Gradient masking focuses on hiding the gradient in-
formation while adversarial sample detection methods can
deny access for those detected inputs. Nevertheless, as the
decision boundaries are more or less the same in gradient
masking methods, they are still highly vulnerable to black-
box transfer attacks [39]. In the dynamic spectrum sensing
scenario, the LEB attack essentially is a kind of black-
box attacks. Existing adversarial sample detection methods
are rather heuristic and usually involve training an attack
detector [40] based on the ground truth, which falls within
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the traditional defenses in spectrum sensing.
Instead of finding a solution in the machine learning do-
main that unfortunately has not yet well solved the adver-
sarial example issue in cooperative spectrum sensing. Our
objective is to design a robust and generic countermeasure
named as influence-limiting policy specifically for the spec-
trum sensing domain. The method aims to bridge the gap
between traditional defense methods and new challenges
posed by LEB attackers through introducing the decision
flipping influence.
5.2 Influence-Limiting Policy
At the first glance, the defense task in our scenario seems
quite challenging in that we must have a rule to differenti-
ate the LEB-based malicious nodes from innocuous nodes.
Many traditional methods have been proposed to counter
the uncertainties of the sensing results from each node.
The metrics of “weight”, “trust value”, or “reputation” are
widely used to balance the individual decision of each node
and the fusion center decision [1]–[8], [41]. All of these
metrics are directly or indirectly based on the statistical
consistencies of individual decisions with global decisions.
Nevertheless, high consistency does not guarantee high worthi-
ness of trust. As we have detailed in the LEB attack strategy,
malicious nodes can purposely maintain a high consistency
with the fusion center to avoid being detected.
As a result, we focus on finding the reason why a limited
number of malicious nodes can succeed the attack after
learning the fusion center’s model. Our key observation is
that the malicious nodes can take advantage of the model
mismatch phenomenon to build up their dominant role
in the decision inference process, i.e., the malicious nodes
can accumulate their influence on the fusion center, thus
the influence of normal nodes are comparatively decreased.
From the defense perspective, although we may not know
who are attackers in the network exactly, we can practically
enforce to limit the influence of any subset of nodes on the
fusion center’s global decision.
5.2.1 Design Framework
To measure such an influence of any given subset of nodes
Xsub, we propose a new metric called decision flipping
influence, denoted by I(Xsub) as the probability that given
an actual sensing result, the subset Xsub is able to find
another feasible sensing result (we say a sensing result is
feasible if it is within the allowed signal strength range)
leading to the opposite decision from the original one by the
fusion center. Apparently, the influence of all nodes should
always be 1, i.e., I(X ) = 1. Unlike “weight”, “trust value”
or “reputation”, the decision flipping influence I(Xsub) is a
direct measure of the role Xsub played in the final decision
process, which can be denoted by the possibility for Xsub to
change the decision output in the fusion center.
One of the advantages of this definition for I(Xsub) in
spectrum sensing domain is that it can be estimated from the
difference of the decision outputs of two extreme cases: In
the first situation, original sensing results xoriginal are sent as
the input, while in the second situation, both the maximum
and minimum sensing results, xmax and xmin, of Xsub are sent
as the inputs. If any maximum or minimum sensing results
lead to different decision outputs than original sensing
results, we take it into consideration when estimating the
influence I(Xsub). The flipping decision influence I(Xsub)
is estimated by the percentage of the number of timeslots,
in which the decision outputs of the maximum or mini-
mum sensing results are different from the original outputs,
among all timeslots of interest.
Starting from the decision flipping influence I(Xsub), we
can mitigate the severe impact of potential LEB attack by
enforcing an influence-limiting policy, in which the decision
flipping influence of any subset Xsub ⊂ X should satisfy
I(Xsub) ≤ δ(|Xsub|), where |Xsub| denotes the number of
elements in Xsub, and δ(|Xsub|) is the threshold function
of |Xsub|, i.e., the influence-limiting policy is triggered only
when I(Xsub) goes beyond δ(|Xsub|). For example, δ(1) de-
notes the threshold to limit the influence of each individual
node. From the LEB framework we know that as the mali-
cious nodes keep succeeding to flip the decision in the fu-
sion center, their corresponding decision flipping influence
I(Xsub) will also increase. Thus any subset including those
nodes will eventually go beyond the preassigned threshold
δ(|Xsub|). We can write the influence-limiting policy as an
non-invasive, parallel method sided with traditional/exist-
ing defenses as follows:
Objective: Minimize the prediction error based on
traditional/existing defenses.
Subject to: I(Xsub) ≤ δ(|Xsub|), ∀Xsub ⊂ X .
(5)
5.2.2 Choosing the Threshold Function
Naturally, the threshold function of δ(|Xsub|) with regard to
|Xsub| lies at the heart of the influence-limiting policy. To
choose the threshold function, we first discuss simple cases,
then present the generic case.
(i) In a well-balanced cooperative spectrum sensing scenario
without malicious nodes, the value of δ(|Xsub|) in terms of
|Xsub| should satisfy the following three basic requirements:
(a) δ(|Xsub|) → 0 when |Xsub| → 0; (b) δ(|Xsub|) is mono-
tonically increasing with regard to |Xsub|; (c) I(Xsub) →
1
2
when |Xsub| →
n
2 , which is to ensure that the influence over
the fusion center is dominated by the majority rather than
a small group of sensing nodes. Based on the requirements,
a Sigmoid style function comes out to be a good choice to
interpolate the function of δ(|Xsub|) with regard to |Xsub|,
i.e.,
δ(|Xsub|) =
1
1 + e−c1(|Xsub|−
n
2 )
, 0 ≤ |Xsub| ≤
n
2
, (6)
where c1 is the control parameter used to adjust the func-
tion to better interplote various practical scenarios. As we
assumed that the number of malicious nodes is less than
the number of normal nodes, which is the most commonly
discussed attack model [1], [2], [4], [7], [8].
(ii) In a generic scenario where malicious nodes may present,
the function δ(|Xsub|) defined in (i) has no mechanism to
counter the malicious nodes. It’s intuitive that when mali-
cious nodes are present in Xsub, δ(|Xsub|) should be limited
to a smaller threshold value such that the decision flipping
influence can be restrained. How can we know which node
is malicious? It is noted that due to temporal or spatial
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unevenness, it is difficult to accurately identify which node
is indeed malicious by looking at the statistical property of
the signal strengths. Therefore, instead of offering a hard
decision rule to clearly classify a node into either innocuous
or malicious, we design a soft rule to discriminate certain
nodes in the final decision by the fusion center.
In particular, we still leverage a node’s signal strength,
but only look at the changes of its statistical property.
Suppose when a node’s signal strengths exhibit different
properties during the training and testing (or decision)
phases, there exist the following indications:
• The node may be malicious and manipulate its signal
strengths for an effective attack. If this is the case, the
node should be at least less weighted (if not eliminated)
in the fusion center’s decision.
• The node may be legitimate but its signal property
changes due to temporal or spatial unevenness, which
further means that the original training data for this
node does not reflect its current signal property and
thus becomes less useful for the current decision.
In both cases, we should at least less weight the node
with changes of its statistical signal property in the final
decision. Therefore, we adopt the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-
S) statistic to quantify such a change for a node. For node j,
the K-S statistic djks is
djks = sup
x
|F jT (x)− F
j
C(x)|, (7)
where F jT (x) is the training data distribution for node j
and F jC(x) is the empirical distribution of node j’s signal
strength input to the fusion center during a given test pe-
riod, representing its current signal property. sup(·) denotes
the maximum value or upper bound.
Based on Eq. (7), we present our generalized influence-
limiting policy as
δ(|Xsub|) =
1
1 + e−c1(|Xsub|−
n
2 )
− c2
∑
j∈Xsub
djks,
0 ≤ |Xsub| ≤
n
2
, 0 < δ(|Xsub|) < 1,
(8)
where c1 is a cost control parameter and c2 is an influence
control parameter. The policy ensures that the more abnor-
mal for nodes in Xsub, the larger
∑
j∈Xsub
djks will be and
thus the smaller the threshold δ(|Xsub|) will be. When all
the nodes in Xsub are normal nodes,
∑
j∈Xsub
djks is expected
to be very small.
5.2.3 Enforcing Influence-Limiting
In the fusion center, the objective of the defense is to
mitigate the impact posed by potentially malicious nodes
through enforcing the influence-limiting policy, i.e., limit
the decision flipping influence of any given Xsub within the
range of [0, δ(|Xsub|)]. There are multiple ways to enforce
the policy, our solution is to re-weight the sensing results
of Xsub. Specifically, when the measured decision flipping
influence I(Xsub) goes beyond δ(|Xsub|) in a traditional
defense method, the influence-limiting policy will limit the
weight of Xsub to a threshold. In other words, the weight
w(Xsub) can be written as
w(Xsub) =
{
δ(|Xsub|), I(Xsub) ≥ δ(|Xsub|),
original weight, Otherwise.
(9)
Algorithm 2: Influence-limiting policy
Input : Historical sensing results of X and the
corresponding decision outputs in Y ;
parameters c1, c2, η;
1 for each Xsub according to the value of η:
2 Calculate decision flipping influence I(Xsub);
3 Compute threshold δ(|Xsub|);
4 Enforce influence through limiting the weight
w(Xsub);
5 end for
6 Feedback w(Xsub) to traditional/existing defenses.
5.2.4 Balancing Effectiveness and Complexity
It is worth noting that in order to achieve the objective
defined in Eq. (5), we have to consider all possible subsets
in X . It becomes computationally cumbersome to enforce
the full influence-limiting policy on a cooperative spectrum
sensing network with a large number of nodes, as the total
number of subsets in X with n nodes is
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
.
Therefore, we provide a more realistic strategy to reduce
the complexity of the influence-limiting policy. We introduce
a parameter η, 0 < η ≤ n in the influence-limiting policy
and consider limiting the influence of any subset which has
no more than η elements. For example, η = 1means that we
perform influence-limiting policy only on individual nodes
inside the network and η = n means a full scale influence-
limiting policy that evaluate on all possible combinations of
Xsub. Through adjusting the value of η, we can balance the
complexity of the influence-limiting policy and the effective-
ness against a potential attack.
The step-by-step process of the influence-limiting policy
can be seen from the Algorithm 2. The advantage of using
influence-limiting policy is that we can add this enforcement
as a parallel, non-invasive constraint to the primary/tradi-
tional decision method in the fusion center, because tradi-
tional spectrum sensing methods have a well-balanced goal
to maximize the channel utilization. The influence-limiting
policy is applied to bridge the gap between traditional
defenses and the new adversarial machine learning based
attacks, such as LEB attacks.
5.3 Experimental Validation
We then evaluate the performance of the proposed
influence-limiting policy using the collected dataset. The ex-
perimental configurations are the same as those in Section 4.
In this part of experiments, we adopt the trust value-based
method [5] as the existing fusion center defense mechanism.
5.3.1 Measurement of the K-S Statistic
First, we examine the feasibility for the influence-limiting
policy to use the K-S statistic of each node to set the thresh-
old of I(Xsub). We illustrate the commutative probabilities
of signal strengths of normal nodes (12 out of 20) before and
after the LEB attack starts in Fig. 12 and those of malicious
nodes (8 out of 20) in Fig. 13. From the figures, we can ob-
serve that when the LEB attack starts, malicious nodes tend
to have a larger deviation of the statistical property from the
training data than normal nodes. Thus, for any given Xsub,
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Fig. 12: The commutative probability distribution compari-
son of normal nodes before and after LEB attacks.
we can use
∑
j∈Xsub
djks in Eq. (8) as an indication of their
deviations from training data. The larger the deviation, the
more limits we should place to curb its influence I(|Xsub|)
by reducing its threshold σ(|Xsub|).
5.3.2 Impact of c1 and c2 for δ(|Xsub|)
Next, we measure the impacts of parameters c1 and c2 with
regard to the threshold δ(|Xsub|) in Eq.(8) on the defense
performance of the influence-limiting policy.
It is obvious that the limitation caused by δ(|Xsub|) will
lead to a performance cost for the fusion center, especially
when there is no malicious node. The cost essentially de-
pends on c1 in Eq. (8). According to the mathematical
property of Sigmoid function, the smaller the value of c1,
the less limitation will be enforced; i.e., the cost when no
malicious nodes are present will be smaller. On the other
hand, however, a smaller c1 makes the system suffer more
damage whenmalicious nodes are indeed present. Similarly,
a larger value of c2 makes sure that a potentially malicious
node will be penalized more but may also penalize legit-
imate nodes more when there is no attack. Therefore, we
evaluate a wide range of choices of c1 and c2 to observe the
balance between the performance without the attack and the
defense effectiveness in the presence of the attack.
Case 1: No malicious node. In the case where no malicious
node exists, all the 20 sensing nodes report the true sensed
values to the fusion center. We illustrate the overall disrup-
tion ratio in 1000 timeslots with regard to influence-limiting
policy of different values for c1 and c2 in Fig. 14 (a). When
evaluating one parameter, we fix the other parameter as
the two parameters are independent from each other. We
can observe from Fig. 14(a) that when no malicious node is
present, the overall disruption ratio is increasing with the
increase of both the values of c1 and c2, which is the slight
cost of the influence-limiting policy.
Case 2: With LEB attacks. When LEB attacks are present,
we evaluate the scenario where there exist 8 malicious
nodes out of 20 nodes (i.e., m = 8 and n = 20). The
relationship between different values of c1 and c2 and the
overall disruption ratio is shown in Fig. 14(b). When the
value of c1 or c2 is very small, the influence limitation is
negligible. The defense performance is demonstrated when
the values of the two parameters increased beyond 0.05 for
c1 and 0.5 for c2.
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Fig. 13: The commutative probability distribution compari-
son of malicious nodes before and after LEB attacks.
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Fig. 14: The relationship between different values of param-
eters c1 , c2 and the overall disruption ratio (a) when no
malicious node exists and (b) when LEB attacks are present.
For the influence-limiting policy to achieve its full poten-
tial of defense capability, we want to choose the parameter
values of c1 and c2 that can decrease the overall disruption
ratio dramatically when malicious nodes exist, while still
maintains a slight cost when no malicious node is present.
Combining the experimental results of the above two cases,
we can observe that c1 and c2 can be chosen above 0.05 and
0.5, respectively.
5.3.3 Impact of η on Defense
We also evaluate the defense performance under different
values of η. The parameter η balances the complexity and
the defense performance of the influence-limiting policy. We
adopt the settings of c1 = 0.6, c2 = 0.08 in this group of
experiments. The overall disruption ratios under different
numbers of malicious nodes with LEB attack are shown
in Fig. 15. The results demonstrate that when η = 4, the
performance improvement is almost negligible for different
cases of m = 2, 4, 6, and 8.
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Fig. 15: The overall disruption ratio given different value of
η with different m.
TABLE 2: The overall disruption ratios with different num-
bers of malicious nodes m.
LEB attacks
Influence- m
limiting policy 2 4 6 8
absent absent 0.002
present absent 0.06 0.21 0.34 0.45
absent present 0.008
present present 0.013 0.05 0.082 0.095
5.3.4 Varying the Number of Malicious Nodes
Given the parameters c1 and c2, η obtained, we conduct the
comparisons of the influence-limiting policy-based defense
with existing defenses in cooperative spectrum sensing.
We first compare the defense performance comparison
of four cases in cooperative spectrum sensing: (i) No LEB
attack and no influence-limiting policy in the fusion center;
(ii) LEB attacks are present without the influence-limiting
policy; (iii) No LEB attack while influence-limiting policy is
enforced; (iv) Both LEB attacks and influence-limiting policy
are present. We compared the performance in terms of the
overall disruption ratio for m = 2, 4, 6, 8 in Table 2, which
demonstrates that the cost of influence-limiting policy is
very slight when no malicious node is present (with an
overall disruption ratio of 0.008 compared to 0.002 when
influence-limiting policy is absent). Compared with no
influence-limiting policy is equipped, the average defense
performance improvement of influence-limiting policy in
terms of overall disruption ratio is around 78% when LEB
attacks exist, which shows the effectiveness of the defense.
Besides the above comparisons, we also conduct the per-
formance comparisons of influence-limiting policy-based
defense with other existing defenses in terms of overall
disruption ratio. We employ the same configurations for the
parameters of influence-limiting policy, and set m = 8. The
performance illustrated in Fig. 16 validates our proposed
defense through dramatically decreasing the overall disrup-
tion ratio by around 80% in average.
The experiment results above demonstrate the robust
performance of the proposed influence-limiting policy-
based defense. When no influence-limiting policy is en-
forced, the LEB attacker tends to accumulate their decision
flipping influence on the fusion center, further to compro-
mise the decision process. The influence-limiting policy-
based defense can effectively limit the attack capability of
malicious nodes.
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Fig. 16: The overall disruption ratio comparison of
influence-limiting policy on different defenses.
6 RELATED WORK
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing and Defense Cooperative
spectrum sensing is an efficient way to detect the spectrum
usages of TV white space channels. Defenses like statistics-
based, machine learning-based, and trust-based methods
have been widely studied. Statistics-based defense meth-
ods assign different statistics to the nodes. For example,
an outlier is computed for each node in [4]; [9] obtains
the weighted coefficients of each node; and [10] proposes
a method through majority vote of neighboring nodes, a
Bayesian method is discussed in [11]. Machine learning-
based methods leverage machine learning techniques to
classify legitimate and malicious data. For example, [6], [14]
utilize supervised learning based on SVM to distinguishma-
licious nodes; [2] uses different KNN-based algorithms in an
unsupervised way to detect malicious nodes; and [12], [13]
discuss both supervised and unsupervised ways to defend
the fusion center. A trust-based method [3], [5] maintains a
trust value for each node, which will be used as a weight in
the global decision process. Taking into account such a wide
range of defenses, we present a stronger attack model based
on the LEB framework, which aims to learn the defense then
launch effective attacks. Besides, we introduce an influence-
limiting policy, which is non-invasive, side with the existing
defenses to bridge the gap between traditional defenses and
new LEB attacks.
Adversarial Machine Learning Adversarial machine
learning focuses on learning under the existence of ac-
tive adversaries [42]. The transferability [16] in machine
learning models gives adversaries opportunities to learn
and compromise the targeted models. Adversarial example
generation methods, such as iterative methods [28], [29] and
gradient-basedmethods [19], are efficient to create malicious
data targeting a machine learning classifier under specific
scenarios. Our proposed adversarial sensing data generation
algorithm achieves the same performance as other existing
methods, while reducing by 65% the computational cost on
average.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a stronger attack model against
cooperative spectrum sensing in real world, called the
LEB framework, which offers an effective attack paradigm
against cooperative spectrum sensing. The LEB attack is
designed in a flexible and generic way and can be applied
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to different attack scenarios. We use comprehensive experi-
ments to show the severe impacts of LEB attacks brought to
the cooperative spectrum sensing.
Inspired from the gap between existing defenses and
new adversarial learning based attacks, such as LEB attacks,
we design a generic and non-invasive method named as
influence-limiting policy, sided with existing defenses to
counter the LEB-based and other similar attacks. The results
demonstrate that influence-limiting policy can dramatically
decrease the attack damages of malicious nodes.
Our research results shed light on the fact that the
traditional duel of the attacks and defenses in cooperative
spectrum sensing has to be re-visited in the presence of
new learning-based attack models. We explored the partial
model problem (i.e., the malicious attacker controls part
of the input dimensions) in cooperative spectrum sensing.
How the proposed solution to partial model problem in
cooperative spectrum sensing can work in an encrypted
scenario, in which the communications between the sensing
nodes and fusion center are encrypted, will be our future
work.
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